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1. Introduction 
 
Can we legitimately use average productivity as a proxy for long-run GDP growth? Growth theory and 
empirical applications have widely used the two variables interchangeably. In this paper we perform an 
empirical checking of this practice, using annual data from 1980 to 2005 for a sample of 19 OECD 
countries. We employ a double-step methodology: first we perform a cointegration analysis – both at 
time series and at panel levels – in order to check the long run properties of the two variables and verify 
the existence of a common stochastic trend. Subsequently, as supporting evidence, we carry out a 
simple and straightforward quantitative exercise: we decompose per capita GDP growth into five 
variables, including some supply side and demographic factors, so to be able to identify and quantify 
the ex-post contribution of each of them to per capita income growth. 
Figure 1 shows the values of real capita GDP and hourly productivity growth rates  for the 
economies under investigation over the period 1980-2005:  
 
Figure 1: GDP and productivity growth 
Gdp Vs productivity growth
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Source: WDI and OECD, own computations. 
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Clearly, there are pronounced similarities between the two series, yet there is no perfect matching. The 
aim of this paper is to look deeper into the wedge between the two variables highlighted by Figure1.  
Our findings suggest that those (supply side and demographic) factors usually thought of as irrelevant 
for long-run GDP growth might actually play a more significant role than it is often assumed. Our tests 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between hourly productivity and real per capita 
GDP in our data set, confirming that the role of demographic and labour supply factors can not be 
treated as simple statistical noise over the long run. Particularly, we find that in better-performing 
economies the relative weight of other-than-productivity factors on GDP growth is higher than in 
countries that experienced lower growth rates. This is confirmed by the cointegration tests run at the 
time series level, which confirm the absence of a common long-run stochastic trend between GDP and 
productivity in better performing economies, while rejecting the null in most of the economies whose 
25 years GDP growth is below the median. These results might therefore trigger a renewed interest in 
the determinants of long-run growth and in the growth-enhancing policies. 
 The reason why the factors we focus on are usually neglected, and various measures of 
aggregate labour productivity have traditionally been identified as the unique approximations of long 
run per capita income, has anyway deep roots in economic analysis. In the Solow (1956) model, the 
diminishing returns hypothesis renders long-run output growth depending exclusively on technological 
progress, empirically measured by the so-called Solow residual. The empirical validity of this theory 
has been subsequently checked in a variety of growth accounting exercises. Young (1995) seems to 
downplay the role of pure technological progress in the rapid growth of newly industrialized East Asian 
countries in the Nineties, finding that the “growth miracle” of those years was almost entirely due to 
increasing labour force participation and improved labour quality. On the other hand, Hsieh (2002), 
examining the same episodes, finds a larger role for technological progress by considering factor 
returns instead of quantities in growth accounting. Similar exercises have been performed for the 
analysis of US exceptional growth rates in the mid-Nineties (Oliner and Sichel 2000, Jorgenson and 
Stiroh 2000, Whelan 2000), but were mainly targeted to the identification of which part of 
technological progress played the largest role in enhancing growth.   
However, the ultimate factor allowing the indistinct use of per-capita GDP and productivity 
growth rates is the full employment assumption1; switching from theory to the real world, this amounts 
to assuming that employed, labour force, active population and total population coincide. Alternatively, 
                                                 
1 The exogenous growth models allow an increase in labour force to be a growth-enhancing measure but fail to further 
disentangle the demographic contribution. 
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given the focus on growth rates rather than levels, it means that they are assumed to be constant over 
time. Our contribution aims at challenging this assumption from an empirical point of view, using 
annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005; although these supply-side variables do show 
less volatility over time, we argue that they still can play a non-negligible role in explaining long run 
growth, and therefore should not be completely forgotten in favour of an exclusive focus on average 
productivity.   
While our  results call for a more complete and structural analysis capable of accounting for the 
interactions and the determinants of the factors under consideration, we believe that they can per se 
constitute a meaningful contribution to a better understanding and identification of policies aimed at 
increasing long-run GDP growth. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main idea of the 
paper, applying our proposed GDP growth decomposition so to highlight the role of the “forgotten 
factors”. Section 3 analyses the long-run relationship between per capita GDP and hourly productivity 
in the search for a common stochastic trend using both panel and time series cointegration techniques. 
Section 4 expands on these results by analyzing each variable of our proposed decomposition. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. GDP decomposition: the forgotten factors 
 
The main idea of our paper is captured by the decomposition of per-capita income  
Y
N   at time  t   
into the components of the following identity: 
 
                               
Y
N t
 Yh t ∗
h
L t
∗ LLF t ∗
LF
TAP t
∗ TAPN t                       (1) 
 
where: 
Y GDP=  
 N = total population 
 h   total hours worked 
 L   number of employees  
 LF   labour force (employed and unemployed) 
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 TAP   total active population (aged between 15 and 64) 
 
In other words, equation (1) states that we can decompose the level of per-capita income into the 
product of five variables: hourly productivity 
Y
h  , hours worked per employee 
h
L , employment 
rate 
L
LF , activity rate 
LF
TAP and a demographic ratio 
TAP
N . .  
To the best of our knowledge, a similar strategy has only been attempted by Piacentini and Sulis 
(2000), who, however, limit their analysis to a two-terms decomposition: 
                                                                *
Y Y L
N L N
=                                                              (2) 
Therefore, they focus their attention on average productivity and a wide measure of employment 
(employed over total population), which does not allow to fully capture the role of demographic 
factors. With respect to their analysis, we carry out a more detailed exercise along two dimensions: 
first, we consider hourly productivity rather than average, so to take into account the role of the hours 
worked. Second, we further decompose the employment measure into the product of three ratios 
(“proper” employment rate, activity rate and the demographic ratio), in order to emphasize meaningful 
issues related to the labour supply and the demographic structure. 
Each of the factors in (1) yields different pieces of information about the structure of the 
economy and the scope of policy intervention. Hourly productivity is informative about the efficiency 
level of the employed resources, depending on the capital/labour ratio in the short run, and a variety of 
factors in the long run - commonly regrouped under the definition “total factor productivity” - such as 
technology, public and social infrastructure, human capital and knowledge accumulation, social capital, 
property rights protection, political stability, research and development. Average hours worked provide 
information on households' labour supply. The employment rate indicates the economy's capability to 
generate a level of aggregate demand such that a given number of individuals can actually have a job; 
in this regard, an important role is played by labour market features such as centralization of industrial 
relations, flexibility, trade unions strength and regulation. The activity rate tells us how many persons 
out of the total active population are willing to supply labour services on the legal job market. This 
measure is likely to be affected by many relevant factors: the labour tax burden and the level of 
children care services (which may discourage the supply of labour in families where one component is 
already part of the work force), the presence of long-term unemployment (which takes discouraged 
people out of the work force), the presence of a black market, and even some residual cultural factors 
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which tend to privilege domestic work. Finally, the demographic ratio can be affected by policy 
considerations if we think about immigration regulatory regimes, an issue that is much debated in these 
years in developed countries, or fertility and birth incentive issues.  
Standard growth models assume  
L
LF  LFTAP  TAPN  k   (with  k   being a constant  ∈0,1 ) 
which is precisely the reason why constant returns to scale aggregate production functions are allowed 
to use the terms "output per worker" and "output per capita" as synonyms. By using the decomposition 
in equation (1) we can make the following remarks. 
1) The emphasis on productivity growth as ultimate determinant of long-run growth is still justified: no 
other increase in any of the components on the RHS of (1) is able to determine per se a rise in per-
capita income. In fact, proceeding from right to left, an increase in the numerator is also a decrease in 
the denominator of the term next to the left, thereby offsetting the positive effect. Thus, an increase in 
the effectiveness of labour supply (i.e. productivity) is the only necessary and sufficient condition for 
per-capita growth.  
2) Nevertheless, the relationship between productivity and per-capita output can be "wedged" by the 
employment rate, the activity rate and the demographic ratio. That is, a sustained growth in 
productivity can result in a less than proportionate per-capita income growth according to the dynamics 
of the other factors in (1). 
To see this formally, let us turn to growth rates, leading (1) one period forward, taking logs and then 
subtracting the values of the preceding period, so to obtain: 
 
log YN t1
− log YN t  log
Y
h t1
− log Yh t  log
h
L t1
− log hL t  log
L
LF t1
− log LLF t 
 log LFTAP t1 − log
LF
TAP t
 log TAPN t1 − log
TAP
N t
                                                                                                                                                                (3) 
The economic interpretation of equation (3) is straightforward: per-capita GDP growth can be seen as 
the algebraic sum of growth in hourly productivity, in the intensive and the extensive margins, in the 
activity ratio and in active population. This relation does not allow any full counterfactual reasoning, as 
the partial derivative with respect to h, L, LF, TAP is zero and nothing can be said without a theory 
accounting for the determinants of each of the above ratios; however, it is informative about how much 
of productivity growth is “eaten up” by growth in other factors and about the magnitude of each 
contribution to per capita income growth.  
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 Before applying equation (3) to our dataset, in the following section we check the existence of 
cointegration between GDP and hourly productivity. We do so because, if the indistinct use of per 
capita GDP and hourly productivity is to be justified, we should at least be able to detect the presence 
of a common stochastic trend in the data over the long run. 
 
3. Data and cointegration analysis 
 
The main source of our data are the World Development Indicators produced by the World Bank. In 
particular, we use purchasing power parity GDP expressed in US dollars and we calculate the various 
ratios of equation (1) with the following series: the age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age 
population), labour force (total), population (total, ages 0-14, 15-64, 65 and above) and unemployment 
(total, percentage of labour force). We integrate these series with the OECD average annual hours 
actually worked per worker, available from the OECD Labour Database. 
Using this dataset, we look for a cointegrating relationship among per capita GDP and hourly 
productivity. The use of cointegration tests to verify a steady long run relationship between any two 
economic variable is common in the empirical literature: it has been used when investigating the link 
between consumption spending and disposable income (Davidson et al 1978), public debt and GDP 
(Kremers 1989) and actual holding of the purchasing power parity condition. (Baillie and Selover 1987, 
Corbae and Ouliaris 1988). Here, we first run the test over the whole sample using panel cointegration 
techniques (subsection 3.1); then we do the same for each time series at the national level, to verify 
whether the existence of a common trend can be found in a specific sub-sample of countries featured 
by the same performances (subsection 3.2). 
 
3.1. Panel cointegration tests 
 
Our first step is to apply panel unit root test to check the order of integration of the two series. In order 
to ensure the robustness of the results, we carry out three different tests: the first two were proposed – 
respectively - by Levin et al. (2002) (LLC) and Hadri (2000) (H) and test the existence of a common 
root in the panel; the third one was built by Im et al. (2003) (IPS), and allows the existence of 
heterogeneous individual roots. All tests are carried out in two different model specifications: one 
assuming an individual intercept and the other with an individual intercept and a time trend. Results are 
reported in Table 1: 
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Table 1: panel unit root tests 
Variable LLC IPS H~ 
  
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Y/N -1.117 1.643 4.731 -1.820 16.651 4.948 
 (0.132) (0.950) (1.000) (0.034)* (0.000)** (0.000)** 
D(Y/N) -8.8164 -7.18885 -9.56876 -7.227 0.19459 1.71427 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.423) (0.043)* 
Y/H -2.379 0.901 3.831 2.776 17.105 7.986 
 (0.009)** (0.816) (0.999) (0.997) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
D(Y/H) -14.671 -14.482 -13.123 -12.586 2.308 7.015 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.011)* (0.000)** 
~ Null hypothesis here is No Unit root; p-values in parenthesis 
*, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
Looking at the LLC and the IPS tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 
conventional significance levels for both Y/N and Y/H (in three of the four different specifications). 
The Hadri test seems to over-reject the null hypothesis of stationarity (especially in the case of Y/H). 
However, due to the results of the other tests, it can be concluded that the two variables of interest 
appear to be integrated of order 1 in our dataset (this is also confirmed by the results of the tests for the 
first differences of the two series). Among the variables that appear to be integrated of the same order, 
it is necessary to look for a cointegrating relationship. We accomplish this task by implementing the 
methodology proposed by Pedroni (1999). Table 2 reports the relevant statistics: 
 
Table 2: Panel cointegration tests 
 Individual intercept Ind.intercept and trend 
Panel v 2.43** 
(0.007) 
1.61 
(0.052) 
Panel ρ  1.40 
(0.919) 
3.69 
(0.991) 
Panel PP -1.20 
(0.113) 
-0.003 
(0.490) 
Group ρ  2.79 
(0.990) 
4.74 
(1.000) 
Group t -1.28 
(0.09) 
0.29 
(0.614) 
        The null hypothesis here is No Cointegration; p-values in parenthesis 
         *, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
The first three rows report within-dimension-based tests (panel v, panel ρ  and the non-parametric panel 
PP test), while the last two lines show parametric between-dimension-based statistics (group ρ  and 
group t ), which are just the group mean approach extensions of the within-based ones. The group ρ  
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test is particularly important, as it has been proven to have the best power among the Pedroni statistics 
(Gutierrez, 2003). Finally, we choose to use the non-weighted statistics – instead of weighted – because 
of their better performances in small samples  The majority of the tests point to the non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis in a pretty robust fashion: only the panel v statistics, in the specification with an 
individual intercept, indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship. Thus, we conclude that there 
is no evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the two variables of interest.   
 
3.2 Time series cointegration tests 
 
While the previous subsection confirms the absence of a well-defined cointegrating relationship at 
panel level, in this subsection we perform the same test on single countries’ time series by using the 
well-known Johansen cointegration test. Our objective is to verify whether the existence of a common 
stochastic trend between GDP and productivity – ruled out at the panel level – can indeed be found in 
any particular subset of countries. Table 3 reports the results country by country: 
 
Table 3: Johansen cointegration test 
Country test null p-value 
Australia Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.003** 
0.598 
Belgium Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.004** 
0.586 
Canada Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.041* 
0.270 
Denmark Max.eig None 
At most 1 
0.009** 
0.932 
Finland Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.000** 
0.736 
France Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.000** 
0.464 
Greece Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.222 
0.166 
Ireland Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.110 
0.450 
Italy Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.125 
0.970 
Japan Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.006** 
0.087 
Korea Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.006** 
0.532 
Netherlands Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.355 
0.622 
New Zealand Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.022* 
0.202 
Norway Max. eig. None 0.059 
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At most 1 0.970 
Portugal Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.105 
0.581 
Spain Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.086 
0.230 
Sweden Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.027* 
0.891 
UK Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.107 
0.719 
USA Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.002** 
0.544 
    The null hypothesis are indicated by “None” and “At most 1 cointegrating relationship”. 
*, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
Based on the above statistics, there is evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship 
in 11 countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Sweden, USA), whereas the tests indicate no cointegration in the remaining 8 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK). In the next section we further investigate the panel and time 
series cointegration results. 
 
4. Exploring the “wedge”: GDP decomposition 
 
In section 3 we have established the absence of cointegration between per capita GDP and hourly 
productivity at panel level, while there is evidence of cointegration in a specific subset of countries. 
This result calls for further investigation. In this section we attempt to answer the following questions: 
(i) if productivity and GDP do not share – in general – the same stochastic trend, what is the 
quantitative impact of the other factors creating the wedge between the two? (ii) if evidence of 
cointegration can be found in a given subset of countries, what is the common feature they share, and 
are the quantitative results of the GDP decomposition in line with that?  (iii) are the results on the 
relative importance of decomposing factor confirmed by the analysis of time series volatility?  
Subsection 4.1 is concerned with (i) and (ii), whereas subsection 4.2 looks at (iii). Finally, in subsection 
4.3 we verify the intensity of convergence of each variable. 
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4.1. Growth rate decomposition   
In this subsection we investigate how much of the per-capita income growth in the period 1980-2005 is 
explained by growth in each factor of the RHS of equation (3).  
Table 4 reports the 25-year growth rates country-by-country: 
 
Table 4: 25 year growth decomposition 
country / growth rates  /Y Ng   /Y Hg  /H Lg  /L LFg  /LF TAPg  /TAP Ng  
Korea 61.38% 58.46% -8.70% 0.68% 4.63% 6.31% 
Ireland 53.03% 42.40% -8.90% 5.27% 7.37% 6.87% 
Portugal 28.89% 26.24% -5.92% 0.62% 5.64% 2.30% 
Norway 26.01% 27.27% -4.63% -1.34% 2.92% 1.80% 
UK 25.31% 21.95% -1.72% 4.06% 0.62% 0.42% 
Spain 24.98% 20.13% -5.84% 0.92% 5.88% 3.89% 
Netherlands 22.95% 17.20% -6.84% 2.80% 11.05% -1.26% 
Finland 22.80% 28.23% -3.21% -1.72% 0.14% -0.65% 
USA 21.57% 18.48% -0.36% 0.93% 2.13% 0.40% 
Greece 21.21% 18.18% -2.32% -0.97% 4.32% 2.00% 
Japan 21.08% 26.54% -7.73% -1.08% 4.02% -0.67% 
Australia 20.95% 17.57% -1.64% 0.46% 3.08% 1.48% 
Belgium 20.55% 21.42% -6.02% 1.97% 3.89% -0.71% 
Denmark 20.48% 22.08% -1.13% -0.01% -1.36% 0.90% 
Sweden 19.27% 21.37% 2.51% -2.51% -2.93% 0.84% 
Canada 18.17% 15.20% -1.81% 0.33% 3.57% 0.87% 
Italy 17.03% 14.76% -0.95% -0.05% 2.14% 1.13% 
France 17.02% 26.15% -7.50% -1.75% -0.93% 1.04% 
New Zealand 12.87% 10.51% -0.75% 0.24% 1.96% 0.91% 
MEAN 25.03% 23.90% -3.87% 0.47% 3.06% 1.47% 
MEDIAN 21.21% 21.42% -3.21% 0.33% 3.08% 0.91% 
 
A visual inspection of Table 4 confirms that, while productivity dynamics is no doubt leading GDP 
growth, the two growth rates do not always match perfectly. As a general trend, we can notice that the 
decrease in hours worked is approximately offset by the increase in the activity ratio, whereas the 
increase in employment ratio and demography accounts for the positive differential between GDP and 
hourly productivity growth rates. In some cases, this differential is remarkable: in Japan and France a 
sharp decline in hours worked (almost 8%) made GDP grow substantially less than productivity; on the 
other hand, in Ireland (one of the most successful experiences) and Netherlands, active population and 
labour force growth are responsible for a noteworthy positive differential. 
Figure 2 orders countries growth rates over the period 1980-2005, helping us to individuate meaningful 
subsamples: 
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Figure 2: per capita GDP growth, 1980-2005 
2005-1980 GDP growth
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Source: WDI, own computations. 
 
Median growth rate is 21.21% (Greece); we can thus distinguish between nine relatively good 
performers (high-growth countries: Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Norway, UK, Spain, Netherlands, 
Finland, USA) and nine relatively bad performers (low-growth countries: Japan, Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Italy, France, New Zealand).  Searching for interesting common patterns, a 
useful piece of information is provided, after having divided countries according to relative growth 
performances, by computing for each group a variable capturing the relative weight of each of the RHS 
component of equation (3) in determining the 25-year GDP growth: 
 
                                                           
/
i
i
Y N
gm
g
=                                                            (4) 
 
where i indicates each of the factor on the RHS of equation (1) and ig   the corresponding growth rate 
over the 2005-1980 time span. Table 5 shows the average values of this weight variable for countries 
above and below the median growth rate (“HIGH” and “LOW”) and for the total sample: 
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Table 5: relative weights in “good” and “bad” performers 
 
/Y Hm  /H Nm  /L LFm  /LF TAPm   /TAP Nm  
HIGH 91.40% -16.10% 4.08% 15.20% 5.42% 
TOTAL 97.19% -15.14% 0.99% 12.11% 4.85% 
LOW 104.26% -14.63% -1.48% 8.09% 3.76% 
 
We can observe that, while the negative role of hours worked is similar in the two groups, the relative 
weight of other components is different: in countries below the median growth rate, hourly productivity 
has grown even more than real per-capita income, with a less pronounced role for the remaining 
factors. In better-performing economies, on the other hand, the role played by growth in employment 
rate, activity rate and (to a lesser extent) active population ratio is non-negligible.   
This result can be combined with the statistical analysis of section 3. We found no evidence of time 
series cointegration in 8 countries, which correspond almost perfectly to the group of good performers 
(with the only exception of Italy). Conversely, we found evidence of cointegration in 11 countries, 
which can approximately2 be identified with the sub-sample of bad performers.  
Thus, it seems that economies which performed relatively good in the period 2005-1980 are 
characterized  by a non-negligible role of the “forgotten factors”: in those countries we do not find 
evidence of cointegration between GDP and productivity even at the time-series level, and the 
quantitative weight of the “wedge” (i.e. the “forgotten factors”) in our growth accounting exercise is 
large. On the other hand, in relatively bad performer economies, there is evidence of cointegration 
among hourly productivity and per capita GDP, and the forgotten factors seem to play a more 
negligible role.  
 
4.2. Variance decomposition  
 
We turn now to the examination of the variance of the series. The logarithmic version of equation (1) is 
a summation, thus we can decompose the variance of real per capita GDP as follows: 
 
                           2 2 2 2 2 2/ / / / / /Y N Y H H N N FL FL TAP TAP N tWσ σ σ σ σ σ= + + + + +                  (4) 
 
where the term Wt indicates the sum of the covariances: 
                                                 
2 8 countries out of 11 belong to the bad-performers group. 
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                                                                   2t ijW σ= ∑                           with i j≠                  (5) 
 
In a five-terms equation like the one we use, the analysis of the covariances would be complicated and 
hard to interpret, so we limit ourselves to the decomposition of  2 /Y Nσ  into the five direct effects, by 
building the following weight variable: 
                                                                     
2
2
/
i
i
Y N
q σσ=                                                            (6) 
 
where i indicates each of the factors on the RHS of (1).  
 Table 6 reports GDP variance and the qi’s according to the growth-performance criterion: 
 
Table 6: variance decomposition according to groups 
Country/variance 
/Y Hq  /H Nq  /N FLq  /FL TAPq  /TAP Nq  
HIGH 88.65% 3.54% 2.78% 4.28% 0.80% 
TOTAL 97.75% 4.59% 2.52% 4.04% 0.79% 
LOW 110.03% 5.94% 2.41% 3.50% 0.63% 
 
This result is harder to comment, for the above-mentioned reason: we can not tell the whole story since 
we chose not to take covariances into account (that is the reason why the qi’s do not sum up to 100%). 
However, there is also a bright side for that: by ignoring the cross-effects (which might be cumbersome 
to interpret economically), we can focus on the directly-interpretable percentage of GDP variance 
attributable to the variation in the underlying factors. Table 6 shows that – although in this case the 
differential in demographic factors’ quotas is negligible – the role played by hourly productivity is 
again lighter (i.e. lower than in the whole sample) in better-performing economies, whereas its variance 
is even higher than GDP variance in relatively bad performers. 
 
4.3. Convergence analysis    
 
A complementary and further piece of evidence supporting our findings can be given by verifying the 
convergence among countries in our sample. The convergence is tested by running the following 
regression, based on the technique firstly used by Baumol (1986): 
 
                                                        2005 1980 1980X X Xα β− = +                                          (7) 
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with the sign of coefficient β  indicating convergence (if negative) or divergence (if positive) of the 
variable iX  which in each of the regressions take the form of one of the variables in equation (1). Table 
7 shows the results of the six different regressions:  
 
Table 7: convergence regressions 
 Y/N Y/H H/L L/LF LF/TAP TAP/N 
β  coefficient -0.394** -0.298** -0.240* -0.561** -0.447** -0.664** 
Standard error 0.096 0.084 0.110 0.120 0.098 0.100 
t-statistic (-4.07) (-3.53) (-2.17) (-4.68) (-4.54) (-6.63) 
     *, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
Over the period 1980-2005, we can observe convergence for all the variables under consideration. A 
particular feature is noteworthy: the intensity of per capita income convergence (-0.394) is much higher 
than the corresponding value for hourly productivity convergence (-0.298). We interpret this result as a 
further confirmation of the role played by the remaining factors: the higher intensity of convergence in 
employment rate, activity rate and total active population helped to fill the gap between intensities in 
GDP and productivity convergence processes.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The assumption of full utilization of resources have so far made possible to use interchangeably real 
per capita GDP and (a measure of) average productivity. In this paper we implemented an empirical 
test of this assumption on a panel of 19 OECD countries using annual data for hourly productivity, 
hours worked per employee, employment and activity rates and active population over total population 
for the period 1980-2005. We first verified the long-run properties of GDP and productivity by 
performing a number of cointegration tests; then, we investigated more adequately the wedge between 
these two variables, by applying a GDP decomposition capable of disentangling income growth into 
five variables, included some supply side and demographic factors. We concluded that the indistinct 
use of GDP and productivity is not always fully justifiable, as we were not able to find cointegration at 
panel level and our GDP decomposition analysis indicates that the role of other factors is far from 
being negligible. Particularly, along both dimensions of analysis, we were able to distinguish two 
groups of countries characterized by different features. In better-performing economies we do not find 
evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship, and we also find that the relative 
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weight of productivity in explaining growth is lower than in countries with a worse 25 year growth rate, 
thus unveiling a non negligible role of the three supply side and demographic variables, that we 
labelled as the “forgotten factors”. Our finding suggests that these factors played a larger role than it is 
usually assigned to them by standard theory, and that growth models aiming at explaining the long run 
growth dynamics should take them into proper account.  
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